Suppliers’ access to voluntary sustainability standards by FIORINI, Matteo et al.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RSCAS 2017/18 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
Global Governance Programme-260 
Suppliers’ Access to Voluntary Sustainability Standards 
 
Matteo Fiorini, Bernard Hoekman, Marion Jansen, Philip 
Schleifer, Olga Solleder, Regina Taimasova and Joseph Wozniak 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
  
European University Institute 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
Global Governance Programme 
 
 
 
Suppliers’ Access to Voluntary Sustainability Standards 
 
  
 
Matteo Fiorini, Bernard Hoekman, Marion Jansen, Philip 
Schleifer, Olga Solleder, Regina Taimasova and Joseph Wozniak 
EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2017/18 
 
   
This text may be downloaded only for personal research purposes. Additional reproduction for other 
purposes, whether in hard copies or electronically, requires the consent of the author(s), editor(s).  
If cited or quoted, reference should be made to the full name of the author(s), editor(s), the title, the 
working paper, or other series, the year and the publisher. 
 
 
 
ISSN 1028-3625 
© Matteo Fiorini, Bernard Hoekman, Marion Jansen, Philip Schleifer, Olga Solleder, Regina 
Taimasova and Joseph Wozniak, 2017 
Printed in Italy, March 2017 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana 
I – 50014 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) 
Italy 
www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Publications/ 
www.eui.eu 
cadmus.eui.eu 
  
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS), created in 1992 and directed by 
Professor Brigid Laffan, aims to develop inter-disciplinary and comparative research and to promote 
work on the major issues facing the process of integration and European society. 
The Centre is home to a large post-doctoral programme and hosts major research programmes and 
projects, and a range of working groups and ad hoc initiatives. The research agenda is organised 
around a set of core themes and is continuously evolving, reflecting the changing agenda of European 
integration and the expanding membership of the European Union.  
Details of the research of the Centre can be found on:  
http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Research/ 
Research publications take the form of Working Papers, Policy Papers, Policy Briefs, Distinguished 
Lectures, Research Project Reports and Books.  
Most of these are also available on the RSCAS website:  
http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Publications/ 
The EUI and the RSCAS are not responsible for the opinion expressed by the author(s).  
 
 
The Global Governance Programme at the EUI 
The Global Governance Programme is one of the flagship programmes of the Robert Schuman Centre 
for Advanced Studies at the European University Institute (EUI). It aims to: build a community of 
outstanding professors and scholars, produce high quality research and, engage with the world of 
practice through policy dialogue. At the Global Governance Programme, established and early career 
scholars research, write on and discuss, within and beyond academia, issues of global governance, 
focussing on four broad and interdisciplinary areas: European, Transnational and Global Governance; 
Global Economics; Europe in the World; and Cultural Pluralism. 
The Programme also aims to contribute to the fostering of present and future generations of policy and 
decision makers through its unique executive training programme, the Academy of Global 
Governance, where theory and “real world” experience meet. At the Academy, executives, policy 
makers, diplomats, officials, private sector professionals and academics, have the opportunity to meet, 
share views and debate with leading academics, top-level officials, heads of international organisations 
and senior executives, on topical issues relating to governance.  
For more information: http://globalgovernanceprogramme.eui.eu 
 
 
 
  
Abstract 
Voluntary Sustainability Standards (VSS) have long become a usual attribute of international 
production and trade. Despite the fact that VSS are not legally binding, in order to be a part of global 
value chains, they have become de facto mandatory, and non-compliance may lead to exclusion of 
producers from the value chains. The relevance of VSS is reflected by a growing literature across 
social sciences, in particular economics and political science. This paper describes a new database that 
collects comparable information on 180 standards and their governance structure, across a wide range 
of products and countries. We conduct a first empirical analysis of this data with a primary focus on 
two aspects of standards and their governance: their practices and features in support of producers, and 
their geographic availability. We find high variability of support and availability across standards 
systems and countries respectively. Finally, we identify standards- and country-specific features 
associated with higher support to producers and higher geographic availability.  
Keywords 
Standards, voluntary sustainability standards, sustainable development, SME, Global Value Chains, 
Certification. 
JEL Classification: F13, L15, O10, Q01 
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1. Introduction* 
Voluntary Sustainability Standards (VSS) have become an attribute of international production and 
trade. Between 2008 and 2014, areas certified by the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil increased 
almost thirtyfold, while the Rainforest Alliance/Sustainable Agriculture Network’s area of coverage 
expanded more than nine times. Similarly, the UTZ certified area grew by 6.5 times between 2010 and 
2014 (ITC, 2016). Standards related to working conditions and the protection of basic human rights 
play an important role in supporting corporate social responsibility. The Ethical Trading Initiative 
(ETI) Base Code, Social Accountability 8000 (SA 8000) Standard, and the Business Social 
Compliance Initiative (BSCI) Code of Conduct are among the major social responsibility schemes 
currently applied worldwide. 
A key driver behind the growth of VSS is internationalization of supply chains, or rise of global 
value chains (GVCs), as companies nowadays source products from all over the world. The rise of 
global value chains has facilitated efficiency gains and given consumers access to greater variety and 
lower-priced products. Supply chains have made production more complex. Lead firms need to be able 
to ensure that suppliers conform to quality and safety standards, and establish systems to monitor the 
production process, including the traceability of the origin and flow of inputs and processed products. 
Product and production process standards developed by the private sector are among several tools used 
to ensure that suppliers satisfy minimum quality, safety, social and environmental norms. VSS may 
become de facto mandatory as non-compliance can imply exclusion of producers from GVCs. 
Moreover, VSS are not a simple phenomenon: they are complex systems, whose status, defining 
components, and scope can vary significantly from one system to another. Some of these standards 
have been adopted by companies and others by consumer groups. Several initiatives overlap with each 
other and compete in the market. Producers may confront significant complexity and uncertainty over 
which standards to adopt. The same is true for consumers seeking to buy products that conform to 
environmental, social and quality standards. 
Analyses of VSS have tended to take a micro perspective in the sense the focus is on the 
identification and definition of detailed typologies of VSS and their mechanics. This has generated a 
broad and interdisciplinary literature on the topic, populated by theoretical models and case studies. In 
this paper we complement this micro literature with a more macro perspective, providing an overview 
of the global VSS landscape. A macro perspective allows detecting common patterns across a 
representative population of standards system regarding the design and implementation of standards, 
their policy objectives and costs for producers. The analysis is based on a data collection project called 
Standards Map, launched in 2011 by the International Trade Centre (ITC), a joint agency of the United 
Nations and the World Trade Organization (WTO). The Standards Map database covers more than 
200 VSS systems and offers an unparalleled coverage of the various aspects of their institutional 
design. Moreover, the data allows mapping the systems’ operations to sectors and countries, providing 
a unique perspective on the global landscape of standards systems. 
                                                     
*
 This paper has also been issued as ITC working paper WP-04-2016.E under the title “Exploring Voluntary Sustainability 
Standards using ITC Standards Map: On the accessibility of Voluntary Sustainability Standards for suppliers.” The paper 
benefited from helpful comments received from participants and panellists in the following events: Productivity, non-
tariff barriers, and openness annual conference (PRONTO, 26-27 February 2016, Vienna), Conference on Dynamics, 
Economic Growth and International Trade (DEGIT, 1-2 September 2016, Nottingham), and World Trade Forum: Behind-
the-border policies and global trade (WTF, 23-24 September 2016, Florence). Views expressed in this paper are those of 
the authors and do not necessarily coincide with those of ITC, UN or WTO. The designations employed and the 
presentation of material in this paper do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the 
International Trade Centre or the World Trade Organization concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or 
area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. Mention of firms, products and 
product brands does not imply the endorsement of ITC or the WTO. 
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VSS are often considered costly for producers. In this paper, we examine determinants of such 
costs in terms of the governance of such standards and in terms of country characteristics. In 
particular, two specific aspects of VSS are explored: their practices and features in support of 
producers, and their geographic availability across countries. The database reveals there is great 
variability in both activities to support producers at the system level and the availability of VSS at the 
country level. We identify system- and country-specific features associated with greater support to 
producers and higher geographic availability. A more producer friendly design at the level of 
standards systems is significantly and robustly associated with participation in meta-standard 
frameworks such as the ISEAL alliance, which emerges as positively correlated with the likelihood of 
offering direct support activities to producers, more transparent practices and better shared 
implementation and certification cost schemes. A positive association is also found between producer 
friendliness and engagement of both producers and buyers in the management of VSS systems. 
Availability of VSS at the country level is strongly and statistically significantly correlated with 
country size and measures of institutional capacity. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 starts with defining standards systems and some of the 
concepts that are the object of subsequent analysis. Section 3 offers a selective overview of the 
existing economics and political science literature on social and environmental standards. Section 4 
describes the Standards Map project and general structure of the database. Section 5 comprises an 
empirical analysis of producers’ support and geographic availability of VSS. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Terminology and concepts 
The Standards Map spans a wide range of sustainability standards. Collectively, we refer to them as 
VSS – a term widely used in academic publications and policy circles. There is, however, no 
universally agreed definition of what exactly a VSS is. The United Nations Forum on Sustainability 
Standards (UNFSS), for instance, describes them as “specifying requirements that producers, traders, 
manufacturers, retailers or service providers may be asked to meet, relating to a wide range of 
sustainability metrics, including respect for basic human rights, worker health and safety, the 
environmental impacts of production, community relations, land use planning and others.”1 The 
standards covered in the analysis that follows can all be considered VSS according to the UNFSS’ 
definition. The International Social and Environmental Accreditation and Labelling (ISEAL) Alliance 
– a London-based umbrella organization of VSS – uses the term “standard system” to describe “the 
collective of organisations responsible for the activities involved in the implementation of a standard, 
including standard-setting, capacity building, assurance, labelling, and monitoring and evaluation”2.  
This is also the definition used in this paper. More precisely, with regard to the standard systems 
listed in the Standards Map, we distinguish the following main attributes: (1) They are not compulsory 
or legally binding (i.e. they are voluntary from a legal perspective); (2) they focus on social and/or 
environmental aspects of sustainability (i.e. no purely technical standards); (3) they feature a 
discernible governance structure (i.e. they are not just a piece of paper but governance systems 
performing decision-making, standard-setting, verification, and dispute settlement functions).
3
  
                                                     
1
 The United Nations Forum on Sustainability Standards (UNFSS, 2013, p. 3). 
2
 ISEAL Credibility Principles, 2013. 
 http://www.isealalliance.org/sites/default/files/Credibility%20Principles%20v1.0%20low%20res.pdf  
3
 VSS are not regulated by a central body at international level, in contrast to, for example, the WTO and its agreements on 
sanitary and phytosanitary measures and technical barriers to trade. Thus, their governance mechanisms, standard-setting, 
and verification procedures can vary significantly. For instance, some VSS like the Fairtrade Labelling Organization or 
the Rainforest Alliance use labels on products, whereas others do not. 
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In addition to defining the main attributes of VSS, it is possible to distinguish different types of 
systems. Most systems are non-governmental and therefore fall in the category of private standards.
4
 
This, however, does not mean that they stand in direct competition to public standards. Often, the 
opposite is true, and VSS frequently reference international conventions in their standards. For 
example, in the sample of VSS studied in this paper, 56% refer to the core labour conventions of the 
International Labour Organization (ILO) (ITC, 2016). In addition to the public-private distinction, it is 
possible to distinguish between single-actor and multi-actor systems, on the one hand, and different 
sponsorship arrangements (private sector, civil society or collaborative sponsorship), on the other. 
Table 1 illustrates these different types of VSS, giving concrete examples of systems listed in the 
Standards Map.  
Table 1. Types of VSS 
Type of system/ 
sponsorship 
Single-actor system Multi-actor system 
Private sector Firm-level codes of conduct. E.g., 
McDonalds Supplier Workplace 
Accountability Audit System; Unilever 
Sustainable Agriculture Code 
 
Standard systems created by industry 
consortia. Examples: Program for the 
Endorsement of Forest Certification 
(PEFC); GLOBALG.A.P. 
Civil society Standards developed and administered by a 
single NGO. E.g. Rainforest Alliance 
Standard systems created by alliances of 
civil society actors (e.g. NGOs, trade 
unions). E.g., Clean Clothes Campaign 
(CCC) 
 
Collaborative 
arrangement 
Not applicable Standard systems that are jointly governed 
by business and civil society actors. E.g., 
Forest Stewardship Council (FSC); 
Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) 
3. Related literature 
Our analysis focuses on the governance of VSS and its effects on implementation costs for producers 
and their availability to producers in different countries. These are matters on which there is both an 
economic and a political science literature.  
Economic research has examined the question what motivates standards (the rationale for voluntary 
standards), their economic effects and the governance structure of standards. One strand of the 
economic literature relevant for this paper is research on the use of labels to signal quality in a context 
of asymmetric information. The theoretical basis of work on this theme is the assumption that 
consumers have preferences for a number of so called `credence attributes’ (Nelson, 1970), defined as 
quality attributes of a good or a service that cannot be assessed by consumers before or after purchase 
or consumption/use of the good or service. These attributes can be potentially assessed only through a 
verification process whose costs normally exceed the means of a single consumer. Concrete examples 
of credence attributes include the environmental/social sustainability of production processes, the 
ethical content of a business, and the impact of production/consumption on health or safety. In this 
literature, standards are typically modelled as intermediaries regulating the transmission of 
information from producers to consumers (or other interested parties such as players downstream the 
supply chain). Labelling is a prominent policy instrument to implement this transmission of 
information in practice.  
                                                     
4
 A small number of systems in the Standards Map have a public sponsor. One example is the Chinese National Organic 
Products Certification Program.  
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In so far as many credence attributes are connected to public goods such as reduced emissions, 
biodiversity conservation or consumers’ safety, standards systems can be viewed as economic 
institutions affecting/managing the provision of a public good. Therefore, the increasing role of private 
standards, and more generally, the presence of multiple standard setters/regulators from both the 
public and the private sector has motivated an economic research agenda on standards systems that 
draws from the analytical works on the private provision of public goods (see for instance Besley and 
Ghatak, 2001 and Besley and Ghatak, 2007). When applied to standards systems, these theoretical 
frameworks identify conditions under which the public sector’s role in certification markets is 
inefficient and situations where a profit maximizing private entity and/or non-profit nongovernmental 
organization may be better placed to provide the public good and improve social welfare (see Baron, 
2011; Auriol and Schilizzi, 2015). 
Bonroy and Constantatos (2015) provide an excellent review of the literature relevant for policy 
interventions in a context of asymmetric information. They organize the literature along three sets of 
issues: i) the market structure effects of costless and fully revealing quality labels; ii) the implications 
of costly and or imperfectly trustworthy certification; and iii) the endogenous setting of labelling 
standards with multiple and heterogeneous regulators (public/private, for-profit/not-for-profit) and 
special interest groups.
5
  
In the view of Bonroy and Constantatos (2015), the main implications of this research can be 
summarized in two points. First, the interaction between standards systems and the existing markets 
distortions is not always conducive to a first best outcome. Second, standards systems bring about 
distortions on their own, which can potentially originate from an imperfect certification process, from 
the preferences of the regulator/standard setter, and from the existence of lobbying pressures. A deeper 
understanding of standard setting systems is therefore important. 
In this paper the focus is on VSS systems operating at an international level. In the international 
trade and development literature standards systems are usually embedded as trade policies in a North-
South trade framework and their explicit objective is linked to the achievement of better living 
conditions for the poor in developing countries, as in the case of the Fair Trade labelling initiative.
6
 
The public good at stake can vary, such as a reduction in child labour, better working conditions, or 
stability and access to credit for poor workers/producers. A number of theoretical as well as empirical 
studies that take this approach are reviewed in Auriol and Schilizzi (2015). These authors document 
the ambiguous impact of standards systems on poor workers’ welfare in the South. Podhorsky (2013) 
adopts a more specific focus on the trade implications of (public) standards’ adoption rather than on 
their role for public good achievement. She highlights the protectionist role of a voluntary standard 
when unilaterally chosen in the North or when non-cooperatively set by trading partners.
7
 One 
particularity of this literature is that it does not pay tribute to the relevance of the design of the 
standard system for the effect of a standard on trade flows of development outcomes. The standard 
system itself, instead, receives a lot of attention in the political science literature.  
In the field of political science and bordering disciplines (sociology, law, and management studies), 
scholars have studied social and environmental standards from various angles. Work in the political 
science tradition has tended to have a stronger empirical focus than the related economic literature. 
However, much of this research is qualitative in nature due to the unavailability of data. The main 
                                                     
5
 Dranove and Jin (2010) offer a comprehensive review of the theoretical and empirical works on quality disclosure and 
certification without a specific focus on quality labels. A key line of research discussed in their review is that of the role 
of competition in the market for certification intermediaries. An important result here is that when competition is not 
perfect certifiers might strategically manipulate information in order to maximize their share of the economic surplus (see 
for instance Lizzeri, 1999). 
6
 For a discussion of the economics of Fair Trade and a review of the relevant literature see Dragusanu, Giovannucci, and 
Nunn (2014). 
7
 See also Staiger and Sykes (2011) for a model of trade agreements and quality standards. 
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strands of research comprise work in the governance literature, the collective action literature, and the 
critical theory perspective.  
A first strand of research in political science is rooted in the literature on global and transnational 
governance. From this perspective, standards systems are seen as a form of private governance – i.e. 
institutionalized modes of social coordination to produce and implement collectively binding rules, or 
to provide collective goods (Börzel & Risse, 2010; Falkner, 2003). Scholars working in this tradition 
have focused on a variety of topics, such as their emergence and rapid diffusion in the global economy 
since the early 1990s (Auld, 2014; Gulbrandsen, 2010; Pattberg, 2005; Schleifer, 2016). Other major 
themes in this literature are the effectiveness and legitimacy of this “new mode of governance”. In this 
context, scholars have studied business compliance with voluntary standards, their wider socio-
economic consequences (Cashore, Auld, & Newsom, 2004; Kalfagianni & Pattberg, 2013; Locke, 
Amengual, & Mangla, 2009), and inquired into the normative and sociological legitimacy of their 
rule-making activities (Bernstein, 2011; Dingwerth, 2007). Finally, a fast-expanding segment of this 
literature, studies patterns of interactions (e.g., competition and coordination) between standards 
systems as well as private standards and public regulatory frameworks (Abbott & Snidal, 2009; 
Fransen & Conzelmann, 2014; Meidinger, 2006; Overdevest & Zeitlin, 2014; Schleifer, 2013).  
A second analytical perspective draws on the collective action tradition in political science, 
management studies, and economics (Buchanan, 1965; Ostrom, 1990). The so-called club theory 
approach posits that firms join voluntary standards because they produce club goods in form of 
reputational benefits. Members can use the club’s “brand” to signal their environmental performance 
to relevant external audiences (e.g., NGOs, consumers, and regulators). In return, they are obliged to 
adopt and adhere to the club’s rules, thus producing social and environmental benefits for the wider 
society. Scholars working in this vein have explored how firms create and join voluntary clubs in 
response to problems arising from “common reputations” and “common sanctions” (e.g., NGO 
campaigning against the chemical industry after Bhopal) (Barnett & Hoffman, 2008; King, Lenox, & 
Barnett, 2002). In addition, the collective action literature has paid a lot of attention to questions of 
institutional design and how it affects the membership, reputation, compliance, and, ultimately, 
effectiveness of voluntary standards (Darnall, Potoski, & Prakash, 2010; Potoski & Prakash, 2009; 
Prakash & Potoski, 2012).  
Finally, a third perspective adopts a more critical view on voluntary standards and private 
governance. On the one hand, these are works in the field of sociology that describe voluntary 
standards as the institutional settlements of political struggles and attempts of transnational elites to re-
embed global production into a regulatory framework (Bartley, 2003, 2007; Guthman, 2007). On the 
other hand, there are studies in the tradition of critical research in International Political Economy. 
These works focus on multinational corporations and the role corporate power plays in the 
construction and governance of voluntary standards. They also cast a critical light on the distributional 
consequences and conflicts surrounding sustainability standard-setting, for example, between the 
interests of actors from the Global North and South (Clapp, 2005; Fuchs & Kalfaggiani, 2010). This 
literature is relevant for the discussion in this paper on the determinants of the incidence of the costs 
across actors of a standards system. 
The discussion above has illustrated the existence of a broad, multi-faceted, and fast-moving 
literature of both theoretical and empirical nature. One type of research that has so far been missing in 
this literature is research that allows for comparisons across standards and their governance. While 
case study-based research abounds, quantitative studies that would allow generalizing findings across 
cases remain the exception and are often limited in scope (e.g., Darnall et al., 2010; van der Ven, 
2015). This paper contributes to closing this gap using information from the Standards Map Database 
(SMD) on standards availability across countries and sectors, varying across requirement areas 
(environmental, social, economic etc.). Section 4 provides a brief discussion of the database, which 
includes detailed information on the institutional design of standards systems, including status 
(public/private, for-profit/not-for-profit), transparency/disclosure practices, operations along the 
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supply chain, certification procedures, requirements, stakeholder (civil society, NGOs, public sector) 
engagement across a number of governance areas including standard setting, dispute settlement, 
verification, implementation and certification costs allocation schemes, harmonization, concentration 
and many others. 
4. About the data 
The ITC Standards Map covers more than 200 sustainability standards, audit protocols, codes of 
conduct and initiatives.
8
 This makes the Standards Map to one of the most comprehensive data 
collection projects in this area. Another important project is the so-called Ecolabel Index 
(www.ecolabelindex.com) – operated and maintained by Big Room, a Vancouver-based B 
Corporation. Like the Standards Map, the Ecolabel Index lists standards, audit protocols, and codes of 
conducts in the field of sustainability. Currently, the Index contains about 465 standards. This is 
significantly more than the Standards Map is covering. However, the Ecolabel Index contains fewer 
data points per individual standard, 60 in comparison to some 1000 data points featured in the 
Standards Map. 
The VSS included in the Standards Map database all satisfy the following minimum conditions: 
they cover at least one sustainability area (environment, social, economic and management, quality 
management system, or ethics and integrity), have a solid governance structure and a credible audit 
procedure (first-, second- or third-party audits).  
4.1 Product and geographic scope of Standards Map database 
Standards Map contains information on VSS covering more than 80 sectors ranging from agricultural 
products to textiles, electronics and services. Three quarters (77%) of standards cover extraction, 
primary production or conversion and manufacturing; 14% cover services and 9% are “generic 
standards”. The latter are VSS that do not cover specific products but rather present a set of general 
requirements applicable in any sector or product. The top three product groups are vegetable products 
(72 standards), foodstuffs, beverages and tobacco (66 standards), and live animals and animal products 
(61). Voluntary standards are also frequently designed for textile and textile articles (36 standards), 
miscellaneous manufactures (35 standards) and chemical industries (35). 
Standards Map captures two geographical dimensions for each standard: (i) the current scope of 
certified producers, i.e. the countries where VSS have producers who have gone through an audit and 
verification or certification
9
 procedure and comply with the requirements of the VSS; and (ii) 
information on the location of the headquarters of each VSS system as well as any local offices (in 
many cases VSS establish local offices in the main countries of interest). In the sample used for this 
paper, 73% of VSS were headquartered in OECD countries. Figure 1 shows the current scope of 
certified producers. 
  
                                                     
8
 The wide array of voluntary sustainability standards, audit protocols, codes of conduct and frameworks will be referred to 
as “standards”, “voluntary standards”, “voluntary sustainability standards” or “standards systems”. The number of VSS 
analyzed in this Working Paper was 180 when the research was conducted. 
9
 All VSS are based on audit, which either conducted by a first-party (producer himself), second-party, a party related to a 
producer, e.g. retailer, or by a third-party, an independent body. If an audit process results in a certificate of compliance, 
the process is called “certification”, in all other cases it is simply called “verification”. 
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Figure 1. Economies where voluntary standards operate and certify producers 
 
Source: Authors calculations based on ITC Standards Map. The software that generated this map does not apply the United Nations 
definitions of national borders; Notes: The relative darkness of the colour indicates a greater number of standards initiatives that operate in 
each economy, i.e. have at least one producer certified. The statistics are based on 180 standards. 
Structure of the database 
The structure of the SMD - its sections, questions and indicators - is based on common attributes of 
VSS, which allows referencing any type of standard, audit protocol or code of conduct. VSS data are 
divided into two main categories or sections: requirements and processes.  
The “Requirements” section captures data on various indicators, requirements, criteria10 of VSS 
and is divided into five sustainability areas: environment, social, economic and management, quality 
management system, and ethics and integrity. Each area is then subdivided into sustainability topics, 
e.g. environment criteria are subdivided into such topics as water, waste, soil, chemicals, biodiversity, 
forests and energy. The second column of Table 2 illustrates this higher level of disaggregation into 22 
topics. Finally, within each topic, there are requirement indicators against which VSS actual 
requirements and criteria are then analysed and mapped in the database. The last column of Table 2 
reports the number of indicators per topic. For a detailed set of requirement indicators please refer to 
www.standardsmap.org. 
  
                                                     
10
 There is no uniform terminology used across the VSS. The terms indicators, criteria, KPIs, and requirements are 
considered identical when mapping VSS data in the SMD. 
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Table 2. Sustainability areas 
Sustainability area Topic Number of requirements 
indicators per topic 
Environment criteria 
 
Animals – livestock 22 
Biodiversity 42 
Chemicals / natural organic inputs 45 
Climate – carbon 16 
Energy 11 
Forests 19 
Soil 10 
Waste 26 
Water 16 
Social criteria Human rights and local communities 44 
Labour practices - conditions of work and social 
protection 
32 
Labour practices - employment and employment 
relationships 
42 
Labour practices - human development and social 
dialogue 
23 
Economic and 
management criteria 
 
Economic viability 6 
Supply chain responsibilities 23 
Sustainability management 25 
Quality Management 
System 
 
Product / service quality management 27 
Non-food manufactured products technical 
specifications 
24 
Food management systems  91 
Feed management systems 238 
Ethics and integrity Anti-corruption and anti-bribery principles and criteria 15 
Compliance to national, regional and international 
legislation 
5 
 
In most of the cases VSS differentiate their criteria or requirements based on their criticality or a given 
time frame for implementation. In order to capture this information, SMD categorizes each 
requirement based on the degree of obligation, i.e. each VSS requirement is first mapped against a 
certain indicator in the database (e.g. soil conservation) and then the degree of obligation is specified 
for each requirement. Table 3 below shows the types of degrees of obligation as well as their 
definitions. 
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Table 3. Degree of obligation of VSS defined in Standards Map 
Degree of Obligation Definition 
Requirements for immediate 
action 
Critical requirements indicate that compliance must be met immediately, otherwise, 
applicants are excluded from certification/verification process. 
Requirements to be met within 1 
year 
Short-term requirements indicate that compliance must be met in less than 12 months 
after initial registration/certification formalities. 
Requirements to be met within 3 
years 
Medium-term requirements indicate that compliance must be met in less than 36 
months after initial registration/certification formalities. 
Requirements to be met within 5 
years 
Long-term requirements indicate that compliance must be met in a period of time that 
is defined as more than 36 months after initial registration/certification formalities. 
Recommendations Recommendations are those requirements that “should” be met but for which non-
compliance is not a matter of exclusion or sanction. 
 
The following example illustrates the structure of the requirements and their degree of obligation. 
Global G.A.P. Crops specifies requirements under four out of five areas defined by Standards Map, 
namely environment, social, economics and management, and quality management system. In the area 
of environment this standard covers several topics, including “soil”. The Standards Map taxonomy 
includes 10 indicators pertaining to soil (Table 2). Global G.A.P. Crops requires 9 out of 10 criteria, 
for example the requirements for soil conservation” and “Soil health (nutrients / fertility / productivity 
/ biodiversity)” are “critical”, “Soil maintenance / enhancement by use of cover crops” has 
“recommendations” as a degree of obligation, while “Soil preparation for specific crops / plant 
spacing” is not covered (see Table 3 for a complete list of the degrees of obligation and their 
definitions).  
In addition to “requirements”, Standards Map contains “Processes”. The “Processes” section 
includes all the other information not considered requirements or indicators of the VSS. It includes 
such aspects as governance and transparency of a VSS and monitoring and evaluation procedures; 
standard setting process; conformity assessment and audits; traceability and chain of custody; claims 
and labelling; support, target groups and costs. 
The structure and format of the database or data entry tool has been reorganized in order to make 
the data more suitable for statistical analysis. The distinction between information on requirements and 
on processes is kept in the reorganized version of the data. From the processes section we have defined 
1,489 distinct variables. A small subset of these will be the focus of the empirical analysis presented 
below. As for individual requirements, the detailed description of all processes variables goes beyond 
the scope of a general introduction to the SMD. 
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5. Analysis using Standards Map 
As a first empirical exercise we focus on two aspects of standards systems: their practices and features 
in support of producers and their availability across countries. These are crucial dimensions for the 
positioning of standards systems within a development discourse. Indeed, the extent to which 
standards’ institutional design is conceived as `producers friendly’ and the operational presence of the 
systems across countries is a necessary first step to assess the role of VSS for the successful 
integration of producers from developing regions into the value chain. It is important to state here 
what the present analysis is leaving unexplored, i.e. an empirical investigation of the actual impact of 
producer-friendly institutional design and operational presence of the systems on their market uptake 
and on the welfare of producers as well as of other actors involved such as economic agents 
downstream the supply chain and consumers. The main reason for this is the lack of a database that 
merges all VSS covered in the SMD with data at the producer-level featuring information on 
economic performance as well as on standards’ adoption. To the best of our knowledge, this kind of 
empirical framework is now available only for individual or small sets of VSS. Assessment of the 
effects of different institutional designs of VSS on producers’ adoption and economic performance 
will require additional data collection. 
The empirical analysis that follows relies on the Standards Map unparalleled coverage of the 
various aspects of standards systems’ institutional design and the global landscape of standards that 
can be extrapolated from the database. The empirical analysis that follows serves three purposes. First, 
illustrating the extent to which the systems in our sample are supportive of producers across different 
sets of practices and governance features. Second, characterizing which VSS are more `producer-
friendly’; and third, identifying some key features of the countries where the standards systems in our 
sample are found to be more available to producers. 
5.1 Producer-friendly design 
We start by exploring three features of standards systems’ organization and governance: (i) how 
standards systems directly support producers; (ii) how and how much standards systems disclose 
relevant information on their operations; and (iii) how standards systems allocate certification costs 
among different agents (producers, supply chain actors and the standards system itself). The general 
focus of this analytical exercise is on the economic role of VSS for trade and development, by looking 
at the characteristics that make VSS more likely to be a tool for higher integration of producers into 
sustainable supply chains. 
Standards systems’ activities that provide direct support to producers represent a first and intuitive 
measure of `producer-friendly’ design. Disclosure practices are equally important in understanding 
this economic role of standards system. On the one hand transparency allows small producers to select 
the standard system that is more adequate to their business and needs. On the other hand, transparency 
contributes to build the standards system’s reputation toward the buyers (actors downstream the 
supply chain), which will be more likely to trust/assess the evaluation of a system that discloses 
information on its application procedures, its certification process, and its dispute settlement 
procedures. 
Finally, cost allocation schemes are essential to understand the role of standards systems in 
improving the participation of small and medium-sized producers in GVCs where downstream 
producers/retailers/buyers often require production at all upstream stages to satisfy a number of 
sustainability conditions. The extent to which standards systems’ institutional design is such that 
producers do not have to bear certification costs alone, or have access to dedicated support, provides 
an indication of how much standards systems are facilitating the process of integration into sustainable 
value chains. 
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For each of these three features of standards’ producer friendliness the SMD offers a rich set of 
data points. 
Support for producers 
The Standards Map data contains variables capturing several dimensions of support activities. Table 4 
lists the five variables that are used in this paper. Looking at these variables we find that the vast 
majority of standards (92%) provide support through guidance tools and other documents. In addition, 
58% of the standards in the sample offer technical assistance to meet standard requirements. However, 
significantly fewer standards – 28% – provide technical assistance to improve productivity, efficiency 
or market access. And while 47% of standards facilitate learning, only 14% offer financial assistance. 
Table 4. Support Indicators 
Variable Definition 
Supporting documents Assistance through provisions of guidance tools and other 
documents 
Technical assistance to meet 
standards’ requirements  
Standard system directly provides technical assistance to help 
applicants get verified/certified (workshops, trainings, 
provision of equipment). 
Technical assistance that goes beyond 
the standards’ requirements 
(productivity, efficiency, access to 
markets) 
The question is relevant for schemes which have capacity 
building approach. Technical assistance beyond requirements 
includes actions like providing resources, coordinating 
conferences or other peer learning activities. 
Financial assistance Advance payments to facilitate the purchase of produce from 
the farmers/suppliers, the existence of a support fund, or the 
payment of verification/certification fess via purchasing 
companies. 
Learning assistance Organizing learning forums, networking activities, conference. 
 
Transparency 
Standards Map contains detailed data about the information disclosure practices of VSS, or their 
transparency. For the purpose of this report, six areas that are of the most relevance to developing-
country producers have been identified. These are free and unrestricted access to information on: (i) 
standards and national adaptation documents; (ii) certification and verification process; (iii) standards 
development procedures and policies; (iv) the application process for obtaining certification; (v) 
complaints and dispute resolution policies; and (vi) assessment methodologies. Table 5 reports the 
detailed description of these variables. 
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Table 5. Transparency Indicators 
Variable Definition 
Standards and national adaptation 
documents 
The standard system provides public access to its standard 
documents. 
Certification/ verification operations 
(names, sizes and locations of all 
certified units, including expiry 
dates, etc.) 
Information on certified operations is made accessible to 
stakeholders. 
Standard development procedures 
and policies 
Policies for standard setting and standard review 
procedures are documented. 
Standard’s certification application 
instructions and forms 
Certification instructions and forms are made publicly 
available. 
Complaints and dispute resolution 
policies 
Complaints and dispute resolution policies on e.g. 
certification/verification decisions, work of auditors etc. are 
made publicly accessible. 
Standard’s assessment 
methodologies 
Indication on the presence of publicly available assurance 
methodology 
 
The key descriptive pattern here is that standards systems in the analysed population are not fully 
transparent across many dimensions. Only 36% of standards in the sample have publicly available 
assurance methodologies; less than half of the standards (48%) make complaints and dispute 
resolution policies publicly accessible. About 50% of them publicly disclose certification applications 
and forms as well as standard development procedures and policies. A higher number of standards 
(61%) makes information on certified operations accessible to stakeholders. Finally, 88% of the 
standards provide public access to its standard documents. 
Costs 
The SMD contains information on two types of costs: implementation and certification costs. 
Implementation costs include all the expenses on implementing the requirements of a VSS and may 
include, depending on the standard, improvements in agricultural practices, social practices, 
establishing management systems as per VSS requirements etc. Certification costs include direct costs 
of audits, i.e. costs of first-time and surveillance audits, VSS membership fees etc. Beyond the 
identification of these two types of costs, the Standards Map database allows to distinguish between 
different schemes of cost allocation. Costs can be either borne by producers or may be shared with the 
other actors along the supply chain and/or the standards systems themselves. 
Producers are often the only actors paying for implementation (64% of cases) and certification 
(55%). Slightly more than 1 system out of four adopts a cost sharing scheme that involves both 
producers and supply chain actors in paying for implementation (27% of VSS) and certification 
(26%). In few cases – 4% for implementation and 11% for certification - supply chain players are 
responsible alone for the costs. Similarly, standard systems pay these costs alone only in 3% and 5% 
of cases, respectively for implementation and certification. Finally, cases where all three types of 
actors – producers, supply chain players and VSS – or just producers and VSS are sharing theses costs, 
amount to less than 5%.  
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5.2 What do more `producer-friendly’ systems tend to look like? 
Support activities, disclosure practices and cost allocation schemes, all pertain to the institutional 
design of VSS. We use the data to estimate patterns of correlations between these economic aspects of 
the systems’ organization and different dimensions of their institutional design. We identify seven 
such dimensions that can be directly operationalized in variables of the SMD and use these to analyse 
how different characteristics impact on support to producers, transparency and the allocation of cost of 
VSS certification. 
The first dimension pertains to the public status of the system. VSS can be established as public 
entities by a ministry, a governmental agency or any other branch of the public sector. Such direct 
connection with the public sector - embedded in the VSS’ legal status – would capture the incentives 
scheme that is specific to a public status. This scheme can be extremely nuanced, encompassing 
welfare maximization motives as well as political economy ones, and leading to conflicting 
expectations regarding the sign of the relationship between public status and the various features of 
VSS’ producer friendliness. Under the assumption that higher support and transparency as well as cost 
sharing schemes result in higher welfare for most stakeholders, welfare maximization could result in 
higher friendliness. On the contrary, political economy motives (such as visibility of government’s 
action for electoral purposes) could be satisfied simply with the establishment of a VSS, without 
justifying additional costs to make the system effective in reaching out to producers. Therefore, the 
assessment of the sign of this relationship between public status and producer friendliness is ultimately 
an empirical question. We capture this dimension with a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the 
system has a public status. 
The second characteristic of a VSS included in the analysis is the adoption of a for-profit business 
model. This should capture the incentives scheme of an economic agent that maximizes individual 
profits. Guided by the literature reviewed above as well as by simple economic reasoning, it is rather 
straightforward to identify a trade-off governing the degree of producer friendliness offered by a 
private, profit maximizing VSS. On the one hand offering support, losing private information through 
more transparent practices and designing cost sharing schemes entail clear economic costs and directly 
reduce the profits of a VSS. On the other hand, these practices can strengthen the VSS’ uptake, the 
success of its certified producers and in turn its credibility. This could lead to higher revenues and, as a 
consequence, to higher profits. The net effect is again ambiguous. A properly estimated empirical 
correlation would then be an important benchmark for existing and future theoretical investigation. 
This second dimension is captured through a dummy taking value 1 when the system has a private 
status and it is not a no-profit organization. 
As a third characteristic, we include the age of a system. An older VSS would reflect the incentive 
scheme of an incumbent while a younger system that of a new entrant. Due to the proliferation of VSS 
it is important to account for dynamics in the analysis. We operationalize this dimension with a 
variable counting the years of a VSS since its establishment. The specialized literature in the 
economics of voluntary standards is not particularly informative on this specific aspect of VSS, but a 
number of considerations can be derived from simple models of industrial organization. Incumbents 
might have the right incentives and the adequate resources to bear the additional costs embedded in a 
more producer friendly design. Depending on the structure of the game between the incumbent and the 
new entrant, the latter could also implement a strategy that entails the adoption of more producer 
friendly practices. This potential implications are already enough to motivate the difficulties in 
predicting an unambiguous theoretical relationship between age and producer friendliness. The 
empirically estimated sign for the relationship between these variables would shed light on the 
aggregate pattern relating the position of a system within a dynamic framework and its attitude toward 
producers. 
Fourth, the empirical analysis accounts for the role of meta-governance, or, in other words, for the 
integration of VSS into meta-standard organizations. The already above mentioned ISEAL Alliance is 
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such an organization. Essentially, ISEAL is a meta-standard setter, creating standards of good practice 
for VSS systems. All organizations aiming at becoming a member of ISEAL need to go through an 
accreditation procedure in which their compliance with best practices – such as ISEAL’s standard-
setting code, assurance code, and impact code
11
 – is verified. Compliant standard systems can then use 
their ISEAL membership as a signal of credibility. To capture the effect of meta-governance on 
producer friendliness, we include a dummy variable that takes value one whenever a system is a full 
member of the ISEAL Alliance. Given the best practice-orientation of meta-governance, we expect a 
positive effect of ISEAL membership.  
Another dimension accounted for in the following analysis is the involvement of relevant 
stakeholders in the management of VSS. We look at involvement of producers as well as consumers. 
Under the assumption that the features we have identified as producer friendly have a concrete impact, 
producers’ engagement in VSS’ management with decision making powers should be intuitively 
reflected in higher producer friendliness of the system. Similar considerations hold for buyers that, 
assuming a certain degree of competition in producers’ market, would indirectly benefit from lower 
costs for producers. These two characteristics of VSS’ governance are directly captured by two 
variables in the SMD, both with a binary structure and taking value one whenever producers or 
consumers respectively are involved into the management of the system. 
Finally, we consider as relevant characteristic whether the system is headquartered only in an 
OECD country (multiple headquarters cases are present in the database). A simple dummy variable 
taking value one whenever a VSS has a unique headquarter or multiple headquarters all located in an 
OECD economy is used as regressor in the empirical model. This variable can be seen as a proxy for 
the capacity or resources of a system, with a value of one reflecting higher capacity. Higher resources 
have a direct positive effect on the implementation of costly activities such as support and the adoption 
of cost sharing schemes. Therefore we expect a positive sign for the relationship between this variable 
and producer friendliness. 
Direct support 
The five support indicators described in Section 5.1 have been coded into five dummy variables, 
taking value one whenever the corresponding type of support is offered by the system. We denote 
these support variables as 𝑠𝑑 where 𝑑 is an indicator for the specific dimension of support. These 
variables represent the dependent variables in our first empirical exercise. Support dependent variables 
are merged with the seven regressors described above. Table A1 in the Appendix presents summary 
statistics for the estimation sample used to assess which features are systematically associated with 
higher patterns of direct support to producers. We omit from the analysis the dependent variable 
capturing support through documents as we observe no variation along this dimension of support (all 
systems offer support though documents) within our estimation sample of 155 observations. 
We use the data to fit four binary probit models, one for each dimension 𝑑 of support. These 
models are based on the assumption that, for each 𝑑, there exists an underlying unobservable (latent) 
variable capturing VSS’ utility from offering support, 𝑈(𝑠𝑑) as a function of the seven explanatory 
variables discussed above. Formally: 
𝑈(𝑠𝑑) = 𝜷′𝒙 + 𝑢 
with 𝑢 being an error term following a normal distribution with mean 0. Whenever utility 𝑈(𝑠𝑑) is 
greater than 0, we observe 𝑠𝑑 = 1, when instead the utility is negative we observe 𝑠𝑑 = 0. 
Table 6 reports the point estimates and robust standard errors for the four probit models. The 
estimated parameters can be interpreted as marginal effects (only) for the unobservable utility 𝑈(𝑠𝑑). 
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 ISEAL Alliance, Our Codes of Good Practice, http://www.isealalliance.org/our-work/defining-credibility/codes-of-good-
practice  
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Given the scope of our analysis, which consists in assessing the sign of the relationship between 
several relevant features of VSS and their support practices toward producers (rather than quantifying 
the causal effect of a treatment on the probability of observing a certain outcome), the marginal effects 
with respect to the utility from offering support, 𝑈(𝑠𝑑), is directly relevant for our research question 
rather than just statistical artefact. Indeed, the estimates in Table 6 capture a tangential relationship 
between the variables of interest.
12
 
Table 6. Support to producers (estimated parameters of the probit models) 
Dimension of support:  
Technical 
assistance for 
requirements 
Technical 
assistance 
beyond 
requirements 
Financial 
assistance 
Learning 
forums 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Public status -0.404 
(0.330) 
-0.732* 
(0.433) 
0.378 
(0.364) 
-0.579 
(0.357)  
For profit and private status 0.0577 
(0.382) 
0.148 
(0.414) 
0.384 
(0.480) 
0.400 
(0.391)  
Age 0.0244* 
(0.0144) 
0.0269** 
(0.0137) 
0.0209 
(0.0134) 
0.0136 
(0.0140)  
ISEAL full membership 0.348 
(0.361) 
0.545 
(0.345) 
0.810** 
(0.354) 
0.843** 
(0.351)  
Producers in management -0.0338 
(0.259) 
-0.142 
(0.267) 
0.426 
(0.279) 
0.554** 
(0.257)  
Buyers in management 0.452* 
(0.270) 
-0.150 
(0.278) 
-0.164 
(0.297) 
0.385 
(0.273)  
Headquarter(s) in OECD 0.441* 
(0.252) 
0.496 
(0.306) 
0.196 
(0.348) 
0.319 
(0.265)  
Constant -0.635** 
(0.314) 
-1.350*** 
(0.353) 
-1.896*** 
(0.418) 
-0.840*** 
(0.314)  
Observations 155 155 155 155 
Pseudo R-squared 0.075 0.092 0.082 0.127 
Note: Robust standard errors reported between brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
For the sake of completeness, the four columns of Table 7 report the estimated marginal or discrete 
change effects computed at the median value of covariates (no public status, no private and for-profit 
status, 14 years old, not ISEAL member, no engagement of producers in decision-making, no 
engagement of buyers on board, headquarters located in OECD countries). These estimates are 
interpreted as the variation in the probability of observing support when the relevant covariate is 
increased by one unit – or, if the relevant covariate is a dummy, when it goes from 0 to 1 – while 
keeping all the other explanatory variables fixed at their median level. Take, for instance, the 
estimated coefficient of the public status dummy regressor in model (2). The implied marginal effect 
of -0.203 means that when considering the median VSS, the probability of observing technical 
assistance beyond meeting the requirements decreases by approximately 20% if the system changes its 
status from private to public. This result is also statistically significant at the 5% level. By 
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construction, the patterns that emerge from the signs and relative importance of the estimates in Table 
6 are fully confirmed in Table 7. 
Public status tends to be negatively associated with support that goes beyond VSS requirements. 
The only positive point estimate for the public status coefficient is model (3), looking at support 
through financial assistance. Even though positive the point estimate is statistically insignificant 
suggesting the lack of any relationship between public status and this dimension of support or, 
alternatively, the absence of a prevailing direction within a number of conflicting forces. Lack of 
statistical significance characterizes the relationship between all dimensions of support and the private, 
for-profit regressor. Age seems to be positively associated with higher support according to the first 
two dimensions, suggesting that older systems might have higher incentives and resources than 
younger ones to invest in support activities. Similarly, ISEAL full membership is positively associated 
with higher support, with the relationship being statistically significant for support in the form of 
financial assistance and learning forums. As regards the engagement of producers or buyers the signs 
of the point estimates are not consistent across the various dimensions of support suggesting that 
different incentive schemes might be in place for each specific type of support. The only statistically 
significant relationships have a positive sign and link producers’ engagement with higher support via 
learning forums and buyers’ engagement with higher support for meeting requirements. Location of 
the headquarters in an OECD country is significantly associated with higher support to meet 
requirements. The estimated coefficient for this regressor is also positive across all other models but 
fails to reach standard levels of statistical significance. 
Table 7. Support to producers (effects on the probability of observing support) 
Dimension of support:  
Technical 
assistance for 
requirements 
Technical 
assistance 
beyond 
requirements 
Financial 
assistance 
Learning 
forums 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Public status -0.160 
(0.128) 
-0.203** 
(0.0902) 
0.0720 
(0.0823) 
-0.189* 
(0.0997)  
For profit and private status 0.0227 
(0.149) 
0.0544 
(0.155) 
0.0734 
(0.105) 
0.157 
(0.154)  
Age 0.00961* 
(0.00570) 
0.00958** 
(0.00467) 
0.00310 
(0.00188) 
0.00514 
(0.00522)  
ISEAL full membership 0.131 
(0.130) 
0.210 
(0.135) 
0.196* 
(0.104) 
0.325*** 
(0.124)  
Producers in management -0.0134 
(0.103) 
-0.0486 
(0.0897) 
0.0835 
(0.0624) 
0.218** 
(0.0994)  
Buyers in management 0.167* 
(0.0940) 
-0.0514 
(0.0932) 
-0.0216 
(0.0379) 
0.151 
(0.108)  
Headquarter(s) in OECD 0.174* 
(0.0973) 
0.151* 
(0.0869) 
0.0253 
(0.0427) 
0.112 
(0.0898)  
Note: Robust standard errors reported between brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
The strongest relationship appears to be between support and ISEAL full membership. With respect to 
the baseline context of the median system, becoming an ISEAL full member significantly increases 
the probability of offering financial support by almost 20%, that of offering capacity building forums 
by 32%. The only feature which is significantly associated with lower support is public status, 
suggesting that political economy forces against higher support might be in place. Finally, being an 
incumbent, being headquartered in an OECD economy, and engaging producers or buyers in the 
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management are all features positively and significantly associated with at least one dimension of 
support. 
Transparency practices 
We now turn to the empirical identification of the characteristics pertaining to the institutional design 
of standards systems which are systematically associated with higher levels of transparency. For each 
of the six dimensions of transparency described above we code a dummy variable that takes value one 
if information is publicly available and zero otherwise.
13
 We then fit six binomial probit models with 
the same vector of covariates used in the support specifications above. The underlying unobservable 
latent variable here is the utility that VSS derive from the adoption of more transparent practices, 
𝑈(𝑡𝑑) where 𝑡𝑑 denotes transparency of type/dimension 𝑑. 
Contrary to the case of the support specifications, the size of the estimation sample varies 3 times 
across the 6 models for transparency dependent variables. For the sake of space we do not report 
summary statistics for each estimation sample,
14
 but note that the median standards systems in terms 
of the values of the regressors remains stable but for the median age of standards. The other 
characteristics of the median standard system are constant across models. The median standard is not 
public, not private and for-profit, it exists since 14 years, it is not an ISEAL member, with no 
engagement of producers in decision-making, nor engagement of buyers on board, and with 
headquarters located in OECD countries. 
Table 8 reports the estimates from the 6 probit regressions. The respective marginal effects are 
given in Table A2 of the Appendix. 
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Table 8. Standards transparency (estimated parameters of the probit models) 
Dimension of 
transparency: 
Info on 
standards 
and national 
adaptation 
documents 
Info on 
assessment 
methodologies 
Info on 
standards' 
certification 
applications 
Info on 
standards’ 
development 
procedures 
and policies 
Info on 
verification/ 
certification 
 
Info on 
complaints/ 
dispute 
resolution 
policies 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Public status -0.283 
(0.382) 
0.509 
(0.409) 
0.499 
(0.467) 
0.0670 
(0.336) 
0.120 
(0.345) 
0.00867 
(0.335)  
For profit and 
private status 
-0.697 
(0.500) 
-0.216 
(0.466) 
-0.998** 
(0.440) 
-0.113 
(0.411) 
-0.702* 
(0.409) 
-0.153 
(0.392) 
 Age 0.0380 
(0.0279) 
0.0171 
(0.0151) 
-0.0109 
(0.0152) 
0.00834 
(0.0133) 
0.00443 
(0.0137) 
-0.0202 
(0.0126)  
ISEAL full 
membership 
Omitted as 
perfect 
predictor 
-0.158 
(0.339) 
0.101 
(0.376) 
1.215*** 
(0.430) 
1.261** 
(0.514) 
1.751*** 
(0.483) 
 
Producers in 
management 
0.529 
(0.526) 
0.786*** 
(0.288) 
-0.123 
(0.283) 
0.753*** 
(0.260) 
0.280 
(0.264) 
0.254 
(0.254) 
Buyers in 
management 
0.137 
(0.531) 
-0.0377 
(0.319) 
-0.204 
(0.310) 
0.0743 
(0.270) 
0.388 
(0.280) 
0.0154 
(0.262) 
 Headquarter(s) in 
OECD 
0.608* 
(0.325) 
0.490 
(0.298) 
0.181 
(0.292) 
-0.0597 
(0.248) 
0.00292 
(0.255) 
-0.0229 
(0.255) 
 
Constant 0.381 
(0.484) 
-0.900*** 
(0.336) 
0.625* 
(0.366) 
-0.350 
(0.304) 
0.0766 
(0.325) 
0.0709 
(0.299)  
Observations 138 121 121 155 155 155 
Pseudo R-squared 0.153 0.090 0.053 0.108 0.102 0.105 
Note: Robust standard errors reported between brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
The following patterns appear in the data. First, no statistically significant relationship emerges 
between public status and transparency: the signs of the point estimates are mostly positive but they all 
fail to reach statistical significance. Second, negative estimated coefficients across all models for the 
private and for-profit dummy reaching statistical significance when transparency is about certification 
application and verification (models (3) and (5)), seems to suggest a negative relationship between 
private and for profit incentive schemes and at least some dimensions of transparency practices. Age 
and involvement of buyers in management do not seem to be significantly associated with any stance 
in transparency practices. Conversely, ISEAL membership and engagement of producers are often 
significantly related with higher transparency. Finally, being headquartered in an OECD economy 
appears to be associated with higher transparency only according to model (1), i.e. more accessible 
information on standards and national adaptation documents. 
Discussing some of the marginal effects for a more intuitive quantitative interpretation, we note the 
following results (Table A2). Becoming ISEAL full member (and keeping all other covariates at their 
median level) is associated with a 44% higher probability of publicly disclosing information on 
standard development procedures and policies, with a 34% higher probability of being fully 
transparent on verification and certification as well as with a 52% higher probability of publicly 
disclosing complaints and dispute resolution policies. Allowing producers to have influence in 
decision making is instead significantly associated with a 29% higher probability of being fully 
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transparent regarding both assessment methodologies and standard development procedures and 
policies. 
Cost sharing schemes 
Finally, we assess the linkages between cost sharing schemes and our vector of regressors. For this 
exercise the cost variables have been recoded to take only two values: “0” when producers do not bear 
the cost alone (because supply chain players or the standards systems (SS) itself are bearing the cost, 
or at least part of it); and “1” when only producers bear the cost. The data are then used to estimate 
two binomial probit specifications, one for certification costs and the other for implementation costs. 
Tables A3 and A4 in the Appendix report summary statistics for the two estimation samples 
respectively. In the estimation sample for both specifications, the median standards system in terms of 
values of covariates is private, not private and for-profit, existing since 15 years, not ISEAL member, 
with no engagement of producers in decision-making, nor engagement of buyers on board, and with 
headquarters located in OECD countries. Table 9 reports estimates from the 2 probit regressions; 
Table A5 in the Appendix the respective marginal effects. 
Table 9. Cost sharing in VSS (estimated parameters of the probit models) 
 
Producers alone bearing 
certification costs 
Producers alone bearing 
implementation costs 
 (1) (2) 
Public status -0.624 
(0.446) 
-0.951** 
(0.470) 
For profit and private status -1.049** 
(0.495) 
-0.780 
(0.532) 
Age 0.0126 
(0.0176) 
0.0245 
(0.0177) 
ISEAL full membership -0.954** 
(0.405) 
-1.444*** 
(0.453) 
Producers in management 0.519* 
(0.312) 
0.465 
(0.316) 
 
Buyers in management -0.603* 
(0.318) 
-0.587* 
(0.321) 
Headquarter(s) in OECD -0.687* 
(0.368) 
-1.038** 
(0.423) 
Constant 0.638 
(0.455) 
1.083** 
(0.535) 
   
Observations 108 107 
Pseudo R-squared 0.120 0.180 
Note: Robust standard errors reported between brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
The utility from adopting a sharing scheme that involves other stakeholders beyond producers seems 
to be significantly increasing with for-profit and private status, ISEAL full membership, engagement 
of buyers and OECD location of headquarter. Counterintuitively, involvement of producers in 
management is positively associated with producers themselves bearing alone the costs of 
certification. Compared with the results above, this suggests producers might use their bargaining 
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power in the VSS management to obtain more transparency and direct support rather than the adoption 
of cost sharing schemes. 
Looking at the marginal effects in Table A5, ISEAL full membership is the feature that 
significantly appears as more linked to the adoption of cost sharing schemes that do not leave 
producers alone. In particular, acquiring ISEAL full membership from the baseline context of a 
median standards system is associated with a 35% (51%) lower probability of having producers alone 
bearing certification (implementation) costs. A similar but weaker relationship is observed for 
engagement of buyers in the board and OECD location of headquarters. 
The empirical patterns emerging from these three analyses can be summarized as follows. ISEAL 
full membership is strongly associated with producer friendly practices across the measures of direct 
support, transparency and cost sharing schemes. This finding is in line with arguments made in the 
political science literature about meta-governance. In this regard, several scholars have described the 
norm entrepreneurship of organizations like ISEAL (Dingwerth and Pattberg 2009; Loconto and 
Fouilleux 2014). Other features of the institutional design of VSS are also positively associated with 
our measures of producer friendliness, although they are found to be less robust. These features are the 
location of headquarters in OECD countries, the engagement of buyers in the board or management of 
the scheme and the influence of producers in decision making. These findings as well link to current 
discussions in the academic literature about the importance of the domestic context and stakeholder 
participation in VSS (Darnall et al., 2010; van der Ven, 2015). 
5.3 Why are standards more accessible in some countries than in others? 
We turn next to the empirical investigation of standards systems’ availability across countries, using 
the measure of geographic scope of current operations reported in the SMD (see Section Error! 
Reference source not found.). This variable allows to extrapolate an indicator varying at the country 
level and counting the number of standards systems in our population that have current operations in 
each particular country. We use this indicator as the dependent variable in a number of linear 
regression models. The purpose of the exercise is to identify relevant country level features that 
characterize economies with higher availability of standards systems. 
The estimated equation takes the following form: 
 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝜷′𝒙𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖 
Where 𝑦𝑖 is the number of standards operating in country 𝑖, 𝒙𝑖 is a vector containing country-level 
regressors of interest, 𝜷 is a vector of coefficients and 𝑢𝑖 is an error term.  
The parameters of interest are identified in the existing literature and include the size of the 
economy (as measured by its GDP), the level of income (as measured by GDP per capita) and several 
indicators of competitiveness. 
The size of the economy is expected to be positively correlated with the number of standards in 
operation. First, a number of papers show the importance of third-party certification for the availability 
of high-quality credence goods in the presence of asymmetric information (Albano and Lizzeri, 2001; 
Dragusanu et al, 2014; McCluskey et al, 2008). This links the operations of standards setters to the 
functioning of the markets of third-party certifiers. As third-party certifiers are generally profit-
maximizing entities, we expect a higher availability of standards in the markets that certifiers find 
profitable. Second, only certain types of goods and services lend themselves to certification and larger 
economies are more likely to have them produced.  
The relation between standards availability and the income level is a priori ambiguous. On one 
hand, we expect that standards availability to be increasing with income as sellers are more able to 
produce up to standards and consumers have more disposable income to pay for credence goods. On 
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the other hand, if standards are set as a substitute for national institutions (with buyers abroad having 
more trust in independent certifiers than in national institutions), then we would expect a negative 
correlation between the number of standards and country’s income, due to a strong negative 
correlation between the quality of institutions and the GDP per capita. 
We expect a positive correlation between competitiveness and standards availability. VSS can 
potentially encourage better organization and production practices, including improvement in skills, 
management and monitoring systems, productivity, good farming practices, resource management and 
access to credit. For example, Balineau (2011) shows that the quality of Malian cotton increased as a 
result of VSS certification through the adoption of innovative agricultural practices. Furthermore, VSS 
can facilitate greater integration in value chains, with opportunities to improve post-harvest 
processing, product quality and supply capacity (Raynolds, 2009). 
The inverse causal chain is also applicable, and again, the relation between standards availability 
and competitiveness is expected to be positive. Implementing standards requires resources, e.g. 
finances for implementation and certification costs, and capabilities, e.g. managerial skills. Hence 
standards setters and certifiers are likely to operate in countries, sectors and environments that can 
reach certain level of quality and competitiveness and more competitive firms will are likely to find it 
easier to satisfy VSS requirements. The value chains and value chain driven standards are also likelier 
to be present in countries able to produce competitively. 
We construct the regressors as follows. The GDP is taken as a proxy for the size of the economy, 
and GDP per capita – for income. Both variables refer to year 2015 and are obtained from the IMF 
World Economic Outlook. The summary statistics of the sample is presented in Table A6 of the 
Appendix. Competitiveness is defined as the demonstrated ability to design, produce and 
commercialize an offer that fully, uniquely and continuously fulfils the needs of targeted market 
segments, while connecting with and drawing resources from the business environment, and achieving 
a sustainable return on the resources employed (ITC, 2015). The average competitiveness score across 
107 countries in our sample is 47.4 with standard deviation equal to 11.7 (Table A6). The overall score 
includes sub-scores at three levels. 
The competitiveness indicators are sourced from SME Competitiveness Outlook (ITC, 2016). They 
are scores [0-100] combining drivers of competitiveness across three levels – firm capabilities, 
immediate business environment and national environment. The firm-level of competitiveness 
measures whether firms have the capabilities to manage the resources under their control. Thus, this 
competitiveness level contains indicators to gauge whether firms follow best practices. For example, 
does the firm have a bank account, use e-mails in day-to-day operations, or have high capacity 
utilization? The immediate business environment level delivers the resources and competencies that 
help to shape whether firms are competitive. Therefore, this level covers factors that are external to the 
firm but still within its micro-environment. Access to power, access to a skilled workforce or the 
vicinity of a relevant cluster of economic activities are examples of immediate business environment 
indicators. The national environment level measure the fundamentals for the functioning of markets; 
government action in particular determines whether or not firm activities are facilitated. This level 
encompasses all structural factors that exist at the national level, such as policies on entrepreneurship 
and ease of doing business, trade-related policies, governance, infrastructure and resource 
endowments. 
The results of the regressions, with models including size of the economy, income level and 
competitiveness, are presented in Table 10. The size of the economy is a significant determinant of the 
availability of standards at the country level: GDP is the strongest individual predictor of standards 
availability (R
2
=0.53, column 1). The magnitude of the effect is large, with one percent increase in 
GDP associated with 6.7 additional standards. Once GDP is controlled for, per capita income is not 
significant (column 2). 
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Turning to the results correlating standards availability and competitiveness, we use GDP and GDP 
per capita as control variables, with GDP per capita expressed as a dummy taking value of 1 when the 
GDP per capita is below the sample mean – to mitigate high correlation between GDP per capita and 
competitiveness indicators (Table A7 of the Appendix). Column three reveals that, as expected, a 
higher competitiveness score is associated with greater access to standards. When distinguishing 
between factors affecting competitiveness at the firm level, in the firms’ immediate business 
environment or at the national level (column 4), firm level capacity turns out to be the determining 
factor. Quantitatively, a one unit increase in the firm capabilities indicator (that ranges from 0 to 100) 
is associated with 0.4 additional standards. In other words, a one standard deviation increase in the 
score is linked to 4.6 additional standards. This result is driven by the capacity of medium-sized firms 
that is most strongly associated with availability of standards (column 5). 
Table 10. Standards availability and competitiveness, controlling for GDP and GDP per capita 
 Dependent variable: Standards availability 
 
VARIABLES GDP 
 
(1) 
GDP, 
income 
 (2) 
Competitiveness: 
overall 
(3) 
Competitiveness 
by level 
(4) 
Competitiveness 
by firm size 
(5) 
      
Log GDP 7.223*** 6.886*** 6.291*** 6.374*** 6.661*** 
 (0.661) (0.715) (0.844) (0.853) (0.743) 
 
Low income countries (dummy)  -3.472 1.552 1.190 1.303 
  (2.546) (3.012) (3.226) (2.995) 
 
Overall competitiveness score   0.355**   
   (0.150) 
 
  
Competitiveness: Business environment    0.0582 0.171 
    (0.158) (0.152) 
 
Competitiveness: National environment    -0.0220 -0.0182 
    (0.124) (0.130) 
 
Competitiveness: Firm-level    0.351**  
    (0.149) 
 
 
Competitiveness: Firm-level (small)     -0.262 
     (0.182) 
 
Competitiveness: Firm-level (medium)     0.437** 
     (0.192) 
 
Competitiveness: Firm-level (large)     0.209 
     (0.143) 
      
Constant 14.23*** 16.97*** 0.0531 -0.0612 -18.90** 
 (2.260) (3.152) (7.190) (7.840) (9.506) 
      
Observations 107 107 107 107 107 
R-squared 0.527 0.536 0.562 0.580 0.612 
Note: Robust standard errors reported between brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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6. Concluding remarks 
The increase in consumer demand for sustainable trade has given rise to a growing array of social and 
environmental standards. The lack of a comprehensive source of comparable information on standards 
systems has to date impeded a comprehensive broad-based cross-country analysis of different VSS. In 
this paper we have used a new database that collects comparable information on 180 VSS and their 
governance structure across a wide range of products and countries to provide an overview of the 
global landscape of VSS. We focused our empirical analysis on the determinants of support to 
producers offered by different VSS and their geographic availability. There is substantial variability in 
the support offered to producers and the availability of standards systems across countries, but that 
certain factors are associated with greater support to producers, notably participation of standards 
systems in meta-standards frameworks such as full membership in the ISEAL alliance. 
The two dimensions of VSS we have focused on are important in understanding the role of 
standards and their governance structure for the process of economic development and the integration 
of producers into international supply chains. But they are just two dimensions of the information 
collected in the Standards Map database. Other relevant dimension of standards systems such as the 
structure of requirements, their product scope, and other aspects of institutional design such as 
verification procedures, stakeholder engagement, harmonization or convergence vs. competition 
between different schemes can all be analysed using Standards Map. These are issues that will be the 
focus of future research on the causal linkages between variables of interest. We hope the descriptive 
analysis of this paper will help mobilize greater use of the Standards Map database.  
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Appendix 
Table A1. Support models: summary statistics 
Variable N mean p50 sd min max 
Technical assistance for meeting requirements 155 0.568 1 0.497 0 1 
Technical assistance beyond meeting 
requirements 
155 0.265 0 0.443 0 1 
Financial assistance 155 0.142 0 0.35 0 1 
Learning forums 155 0.497 0 0.502 0 1 
Public status 155 0.135 0 0.343 0 1 
For profit and private status 155 0.084 0 0.278 0 1 
Age 155 15.394 14 8.176 3 49 
ISEAL full membership 155 0.11 0 0.314 0 1 
Producers in management 155 0.387 0 0.489 0 1 
Buyers in management 155 0.323 0 0.469 0 1 
Headquarter(s) in OECD 155 0.735 1 0.443 0 1 
Table A2. Transparency: marginal and discrete change effects 
 Info on 
standards 
and 
national 
adaptation 
documents 
Info is made 
accessible on 
assessment 
methodologies 
Info on 
standard's 
certification 
applications 
Info on 
standard 
development 
procedures 
and policies 
Info on 
verification/ 
certification  
Info on 
complaints/ 
dispute 
resolution 
policies 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Public status 0.00146 
(0.0462) 
-0.128 
(0.156) 
-0.0720 
(0.113) 
-0.0920 
(0.126) 
0.0242 
(0.127) 
0.0776 
(0.112) 
For profit and private status 0.00146 
(0.0462) 
-0.128 
(0.156) 
-0.0720 
(0.113) 
-0.0920 
(0.126) 
0.0242 
(0.127) 
0.0776 
(0.112) 
Age 0.136 
(0.114) 
0.132 
(0.157) 
0.371** 
(0.158) 
0.0324 
(0.140) 
0.200 
(0.140) 
0.0204 
(0.140) 
ISEAL full membership Omitted as 
perfect 
predictor 
-0.0447 
(0.131) 
0.0344 
(0.112) 
0.438*** 
(0.116) 
0.343*** 
(0.0892) 
0.521*** 
(0.0843) 
Producers in management 0.0381 
(0.0318) 
0.286*** 
(0.101) 
-0.0512 
(0.0967) 
0.294*** 
(0.0947) 
0.0799 
(0.0980) 
0.0927 
(0.100) 
Buyers in management 0.0149 
(0.0537) 
-0.0295 
(0.124) 
-0.0911 
(0.112) 
0.0353 
(0.105) 
0.121 
(0.0988) 
-0.00651 
(0.101) 
Headquarter(s) in OECD 0.145* 
(0.0831) 
0.164* 
(0.0994) 
0.0357 
(0.0963) 
-0.001 
(.) 
-0.00430 
(0.0969) 
-0.0344 
(0.0955) 
Note: Robust standard errors reported between brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table A3. Certification costs model: summary statistics 
Variable N mean p50 sd min max 
Producers alone bearing certification 
costs 
108 0.528 1 0.502 0 1 
Public status 108 0.12 0 0.327 0 1 
For profit and private status 108 0.074 0 0.263 0 1 
Age 108 15.787 15 7.496 3 49 
ISEAL full membership 108 0.139 0 0.347 0 1 
Producers in management 108 0.463 0 0.501 0 1 
Buyers in management 108 0.324 0 0.47 0 1 
Headquarter(s) in OECD 108 0.769 1 0.424 0 1 
 
Table A4. Implementation costs model: summary statistics 
Variable N mean p50 sd min max 
Producers alone bearing certification 
costs 
107 0.617 1 0.488 0 1 
Public status 107 0.121 0 0.328 0 1 
For profit and private status 107 0.065 0 0.248 0 1 
Age 107 15.991 15 7.739 3 49 
ISEAL full membership 107 0.131 0 0.339 0 1 
Producers in management 107 0.467 0 0.501 0 1 
Buyers in management 107 0.327 0 0.471 0 1 
Headquarter(s) in OECD 107 0.766 1 0.425 0 1 
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Table A5. Costs and institutional design: marginal and discrete change effects 
 
Producers alone bearing 
certification costs 
Producers alone bearing 
implementation costs 
 (1) (2) 
Public status -0.241 
(0.161) 
-0.365** 
(0.164) 
For profit and private status -0.374** 
(0.145) 
-0.304 
(0.198) 
Age 0.00497 
(0.00694) 
0.00899 
(0.00663) 
ISEAL full membership -0.348*** 
(0.125) 
-0.509*** 
(0.118) 
Producers in management 0.189* 
(0.112) 
0.150 
(0.0844) 
Buyers in management -0.234** 
(0.116) 
-0.229* 
(0.125) 
Headquarter(s) in OECD -0.240** 
(0.112) 
-0.266*** 
(0.0844) 
Observations 108 107 
Note: Robust standard errors reported between brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Table A6. Standards availability and competitiveness: summary statistics 
Variable N mean p50 sd min max 
       
Standards availability (No of standards) 107.000 40.093 38.000 17.479 3.000 86.000 
Log of GDP (billion USD) 107.000 3.580 3.443 1.757 -0.273 9.340 
Log of GDP PC (USD) 107.000 8.129 8.290 1.133 5.753 10.799 
Low income countries, dummy=1 if GDP PC below 
the mean 
107.000 0.439 0.000 0.499 0.000 1.000 
Overall competitiveness, score 107.000 47.450 48.212 11.709 24.367 80.415 
Competitiveness: Business environment, score 107.000 50.049 48.085 11.017 25.343 81.647 
Competitiveness: Firm-level, score 107.000 49.566 48.932 16.621 15.892 86.814 
Competitiveness: National Environment, score 107.000 42.734 42.315 13.092 14.459 72.784 
Competitiveness: Firm-level (small), score 107.000 35.692 33.027 13.163 12.090 68.330 
Competitiveness: Firm-level (medium), score 107.000 51.174 53.879 13.037 19.658 77.458 
Competitiveness: Firm-level (large), score 107.000 66.689 68.312 11.220 37.579 86.316 
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Table A7. Standards availability and competitiveness: correlations 
 Log GDP Log GDP 
PC 
Standar
ds 
availabili
ty 
Low 
income 
dummy 
Competi
tiveness 
Competi
tiveness
-firm 
Competi
tiveness
-
business 
env. 
Competi
tiveness
-
national 
Competi
tiveness
-firm-
small 
Competi
tiveness
-firm-
medium 
Competi
tiveness
-firm-
large 
            Log GDP 1.000           
Log GDP PC 0.465 1.000          
Standards 
availability 
0.726 0.364 1.000         
Low income 
dummy 
-0.342 -0.835 -0.336 1.000        
Competitiveness 0.458 0.815 0.496 -0.689 1.000       
Competitiveness-
firm 
0.353 0.655 0.469 -0.571 0.830 1.000      
Competitiveness-
business env. 
0.368 0.529 0.347 -0.427 0.775 0.391 1.000     
Competitiveness-
national 
0.445 0.855 0.450 -0.723 0.945 0.707 0.666 1.000    
Competitiveness-
firm-small 
0.311 0.679 0.384 -0.593 0.848 0.959 0.439 0.744 1.000   
Competitiveness-
firm-medium 
0.231 0.606 0.413 -0.525 0.726 0.903 0.263 0.649 0.856 1.000  
Competitiveness-
firm-large  
0.172 0.437 0.374 -0.418 0.514 0.680 0.158 0.446 0.609 0.770 1.000 
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